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Abstract
We reconsider Aumann’ s seminal impossibility theorem that agents cannot agree to disagree in a topologically extended
epistemic model. In such a framework, a possibility result on agreeing to disagree actually ensues. More precisely, agents
with a common prior belief satisfying limit knowledge instead of common knowledge of their posterior beliefs may have
distinct posterior beliefs. Since limit knowledge is defined as the limit of iterated mutual knowledge, agents can thus be said to
limit-agree to disagree. Besides, an example is provided in which limit knowledge coincides with Rubinstein’s (1989) notion
of almost common knowledge, and the agents have almost common knowledge of posteriors yet distinct posterior beliefs.
More generally, an epistemic-topological foundation for almost common knowledge is thus provided.
Keywords: Agreeing to disagree, agreement theorems, almost common knowledge, epistemic-topological framework,
interactive epistemology, limit knowledge.
1 Introduction
The impossibility for two agents to agree to disagree is established by Aumann’s [1] so-called
agreement theorem. More precisely, it is shown that if two Bayesian agents equipped with a common
prior belief receive private information and have common knowledge of their posterior beliefs, then
these posteriors must be equal. In other words, distinct posteriors cannot be common knowledge
among Bayesian agents with a common prior. In this sense, agents cannot agree to disagree.
Along these lines, Milgrom and Stokey [20] establish an impossibility theorem of speculative trade.
Intuitively, their result states that if two traders agree on a prior efficient allocation of goods, then upon
receiving private information, it cannot be common knowledge that both traders have an incentive
to trade. From an empirical or quasi-empirical point of view, the agreement theorem seems quite
startling since real world agents do frequently disagree on a large variety of issues. It is then natural to
scrutinize whether Aumann’s basic result still holds with weakened or slightly modified assumptions.
In this spirit, Lewis [18] show that without assuming common knowledge of the posteriors, agents
following a specific communication procedure can nevertheless not agree to disagree. Furthermore,
Monderer and Samet [21] replace common knowledge by the weaker concept of common p-belief
and establish an agreement theorem with such an approximation of common knowledge. Indeed, they
show that if the posteriors of Bayesian agents equipped with a common prior are common p-belief
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2 Limit-agreeing to disagree
for large enough p, then these posteriors cannot differ significantly. Besides, a bounded rationality
approach is taken by Samet [23] who drops the implicit negative introspection assumption — which
states that for every proposition that an agent does not know, the agent actually knows that he does not
know it — and establishes that Aumann’s agreement theorem remains valid with agents ignorant of
their own ignorance. Yet a different generalization is provided by Bacharach’s [10] non-probabilistic
agreement theorem which states that if two agents follow a common decision procedure in line with
the sure thing principle — which states that for every event and every partition of it, whenever each
cell of the partition induces a same decision, the event itself generates precisely this decision — and
if their particular decisions are common knowledge, then these decisions must coincide. In addition,
Bonanno and Nehring [11] as well as Ménager [19] provide comprehensive surveys on works about
agreeing to disagree. More recently, Bach and Perea [9] show that Aumann’s impossibility result
is not robust with respect to the common prior assumption in the sense that two Bayesian agents
with arbitrarily close prior beliefs can have common knowledge of completely opposed posteriors,
and also provide a lexicographic agreement theorem. Furthermore, the agreement theorem has been
analysed from the perspective of dynamic epistemic logic. Notably, Dégremont and Roy [13] obtain
a non-probabilistic impossibility result with common belief — instead of common knowledge — of
posteriors within the framework of epistemic plausibility models, when the common priors satisfy a
specific well-foundedness assumption.Also, several probabilistic agreement theorems are established
by Demey [14] using enriched probabilistic Kripke models.
Here, we analyse agreeing to disagree in a topologically extended epistemic framework. The
epistemic operator common knowledge is replaced by the epistemic-topological operator limit
knowledge introduced by Bach and Cabessa [7, 8]. Assuming common priors, Bayesian agents
and limit knowledge of posteriors, we derive a possibility result allowing the agents’ posteriors to
differ. Since limit knowledge is defined as the topological limit of higher-order mutual knowledge,
our result can be interpreted as establishing — in contrast to Aumann’s impossibility theorem —
that agents can agree to disagree, or more precisely, can limit-agree to disagree. These results show
that Aumann’s agreement theorem is not robust when considered from a more general epistemic-
topological perspective with limit knowledge instead of common knowledge, with both concepts
being based on the same sequence of iterated mutual knowledge. We further show that the notion of
limit knowledge is able to capture relevant reasoning patterns allowing agents to agree to disagree on
their posterior beliefs. In particular, an example is constructed in which limit knowledge is identical
with Rubinstein’s [22] notion of almost common knowledge, i.e. it coincides with m iterations of
mutual knowledge for some finite number m. Thereby, we give an epistemic-topological foundation
for Rubinstein’s [22] notion of almost common knowledge. However, in general limit knowledge
does not coincide with iterated mutual knowledge up to some finite level.
We proceed as follows. In Section 2, the basic framework of set-based interactive epistemology
is presented. Aumann’s agreement theorem is then given in two slightly modified formulations
and graphically illustrated. Section 3 sketches the topological approach to interactive epistemology
initiated by Bach and Cabessa [7, 8]. Moreover, the epistemic-topological operator limit knowledge
is defined and used for a possibility result on agreeing to disagree. Section 4 presents a plausible
epistemic-topological context in which limit knowledge coincides with Rubinstein’s [22] almost
common knowledge and agents can limit-agree to disagree. Finally, Section 5 offers some concluding
remarks and possible directions for future research.
2 Aumann’s agreeing to disagree
Set-based interactive epistemology provides the formal framework in which the agreement theorem is
established. Having been introduced and notably developed byAumann [1–5] the discipline furnishes
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tools to formalize epistemic notions in interactive situations. Before the agreement theorem is restated,
the basic ingredients of interactive epistemology are now briefly presented.
A so-called Aumann structure A= (,(Ii)i∈I ,p) consists of a countable set  of possible worlds,
also called states, which are complete descriptions of the way the world might be, a finite set of
agents I , a possibility partition Ii of  for each agent i∈ I representing his information, and a
common prior belief function p :→[0,1] such that ∑ω∈p(ω)=1. The cell of Ii containing the
world ω is denoted by Ii(ω) and consists of all worlds considered possible by i at world ω. In other
words, agent i cannot distinguish between any two worlds ω and ω′ that are in the same cell of his
partition Ii. Moreover, an event E ⊆ is defined as a set of possible worlds. For example, the event
that it is raining in London contains all worlds in which it does in fact rain in London. Note that
the common prior belief function p can naturally be extended to a common prior belief measure on
the event space p :P()→[0,1] by setting p(E)=∑ω∈E p(ω). In this context, it is supposed that
each information set of each agent has non-zero prior probability, i.e. p(Ii(ω))>0 for all i∈ I and
ω∈. Such a hypothesis seems plausible since it ensures that no information is excluded a priori.
Moreover, all agents are assumed to be Bayesian and to hence update the common prior belief given
their private information according to Bayes’s rule. More precisely, given some event E and some
world ω, the posterior belief of agent i in E at ω is given by p(E |Ii(ω))= p(E∩Ii(ω))p(Ii(ω)) . Furthermore,
an Aumann structure A= (,(Ii)i∈I ,p) is called finite if  is finite and infinite otherwise.
InAumann’s epistemic framework, knowledge is formalized in terms of events. More precisely, the
event of agent i knowing E, denoted by Ki(E), is defined as Ki(E) :={ω∈ :Ii(ω)⊆E}. If ω∈Ki(E),
then i is said to know E at world ω. Intuitively, i knows some event E if in all worlds that he
considers possible the event E holds. Naturally, the event K(E)=⋂i∈I Ki(E) then denotes mutual
knowledge of E among the set I of agents. Letting K0(E) :=E, m-order mutual knowledge of the
event E among the set I of agents is inductively defined by Km+1(E) :=K(Km(E)) for all m≥0.
Accordingly, mutual knowledge can also be denoted as 1-order mutual knowledge. Furthermore,
an event is said to be common knowledge among a set I of agents whenever all m-order mutual
knowledge of it simultaneously holds. Formally, it is standard to define the event that E is common
knowledge among the set I of agents as the intersection of all higher-order mutual knowledge, i.e.
CKinter(E) :=⋂m>0Km(E).
An alternative formalization of common knowledge is proposed by Aumann [1] in terms of the
meet of the agents’ possibility partitions.1 Accordingly, an event E is called common knowledge
at world ω among the set I of agents, if E includes the cell of the meet
∧
i∈I Ii that contains ω.
Formally, the meet definition of common knowledge of some event E can be stated as CKmeet(E) :=
{ω∈ : (∧i∈I Ii)(ω)⊆E}. Aumann [1] states and intuitively shows that the standard and the meet
definitions of common knowledge are in fact equivalent for finite state spaces. We now formally
show the equivalence of the two definitions for the more general case also admitting the set  of
possible worlds to be infinite, and thereafter, for any event E, the two identical events CKinter(E)
and CKmeet(E) are thus simply referred to as CK(E).
Lemma 1
LetA= (,(Ii)i∈I ,p) be anAumann structure and E ⊆ be an event. Then, CKinter(E)=CKmeet(E).
Proof. See Appendix. 
1Given two partitions P1 and P2 of a set S, partition P1 is called finer than partition P2 or P2 coarser than P1, if each cell
of P1 is a subset of some cell of P2. Given n partitions P1,P2,...,Pn of S, the finest partition that is coarser than P1,P2,...,Pn
is called the meet of P1,P2,...,Pn and is denoted by
∧n
j=1Pj . Moreover, given x∈S, the cell of the meet
∧n
j=1Pj containing
x is denoted by (∧nj=1Pj)(x).
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Aumann’s agreement theorem states that if two agents have a common prior and their posterior
beliefs in some event are common knowledge, then these posterior beliefs must coincide. In other
words, if two agents with common prior beliefs hold distinct posterior beliefs, then these posterior
beliefs cannot be common knowledge among them. Intuitively, it is impossible for agents to consent
to distinct beliefs. Thus, agents cannot agree to disagree.
Aumann’s result is now formalized in a slightly modified way. More precisely, the introduction of
arbitrary values for the agents’ posterior beliefs as in Aumann’s original statement is dispensed with.
Instead, these arbitrary values are substituted by conceivable posterior beliefs, namely updated prior
beliefs induced by some auxiliary world. The values of the posteriors are thus made endogenous, as
nothing external to the formal structure is needed for their determination. In this sense, the following
statement of the agreement theorem is inherent to the formal structure it is embedded in.
Aumann’s Agreement Theorem (Version 1).
LetA= (,(Ii)ni=1,p) be anAumann structure, E ⊆ be an event, and ωˆ be a world. If CK(
⋂n
i=1{ω′ ∈
 :p(E |Ii(ω′))=p(E |Ii(ωˆ))}) =∅, then p(E |I1(ωˆ))=p(E |I2(ωˆ))=···=p(E |In(ωˆ)).
Proof. See Appendix. 
The previous theorem states that, if common knowledge of the agents’ posterior beliefs being
equal to the values induced by some auxiliary world is non-empty, then the agents’ posterior beliefs
at this given world coincide. Yet as a consequence, the agents’ posterior beliefs do not only coincide
at the auxiliary world, but also at every possible world inducing the same values as the auxiliary
world. In particular, every world contained in common knowledge of the agents’ posterior beliefs
satisfies equality of posterior beliefs. Thus, a second version of Aumann’s agreement theorem ensues
as follows.
Aumann’s Agreement Theorem (Version 2).
Let A= (,(Ii)ni=1,p) be an Aumann structure, E ⊆ be an event, and ωˆ,ω∈ be worlds such
that CK(⋂ni=1{ω′ ∈ :p(E |Ii(ω′))=p(E |Ii(ωˆ))}) =∅ and ω∈CK(
⋂n
i=1{ω′ ∈ :p(E |Ii(ω′))=
p(E |Ii(ωˆ))}). Then, p(E |I1(ω))=p(E |I2(ω))=···=p(E |In(ω)).
Proof. See Appendix. 
The two preceding versions of Aumann’s Agreement Theorem provide slightly different
formulations of the impossibility for agents to agree to disagree on their posterior beliefs. In the
first version, emphasis is put on the posterior beliefs induced by some auxiliary world, whereas
the second version focuses on the posterior beliefs that the agents actually hold. Basically, the first
version intuitively states that, if the agents’ posterior beliefs are common knowledge somewhere,
then they must coincide, while the second version states that, if the agents’ actual posterior beliefs
are common knowledge, then they must coincide.
Agreeing to disagree can be graphically illustrated for the case of two agents. In Figure 1,
the set of all possible worlds  is partitioned horizontally in equivalence classes of worlds that
yield a same posterior belief for agent Alice in some fixed event E. Similarly, the vertical slices
represent equivalence classes with respect to worlds that induce a same posterior belief for Bob
in E. Observe that the partition formed by the horizontal slices is coarser than Alice’s possibility
partition, since Bayesian updating ensures that Alice’s posteriors remain constant throughout any
cell of her possibility partition. Similarly, the partition formed by the vertical slices is coarser than
Bob’s possibility partition. Moreover, the intersection of the horizontal and vertical slices forms a
refined partition whose cells represent equivalence classes of worlds that induce a same posterior
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Figure 1. Illustration of agreeing to disagree for the case of two agents.
belief profile, i.e. the posterior of each agent remains constant throughout the cell. Given an auxiliary
world ωˆ — a world which merely serves the supply of posterior beliefs that can potentially be
generated given the constraints of the formal structure — the cell of this refined partition containing
ωˆ represents the event E′ =⋂i∈I {ω′ ∈ :p(E |Ii(ω′))=p(E |Ii(ωˆ))} and includes the event CK(E′).
In particular, note that CK(E′) can be empty.
The claim of Aumann’s agreement theorem can now be understood graphically: given a world ωˆ, if
the corresponding cell E′ of the refined partition includes a non-empty CK(E′), then identical values
for the agents’posterior beliefs obtain at ωˆ, and hence also at all worlds throughout cell E′. Conversely,
common knowledge of the agents’ posteriors equals the empty set in all cells of the refined partition
in which the posteriors of Alice and Bob differ. In particular, the equality of the two agents’posteriors
throughout CK(E′) is established. Finally, note that in the specific Aumann structure represented in
Figure 1, at world ωˆ, none of the two agents know the true fact that their posteriors coincide, since
each agent, respectively, considers possible a world at which the other agent’s posterior belief is
different. In contrast, for any world ω∈CK(E′), the agents’ posterior beliefs are not merely equal at
such a world, but the agents also know that they coincide, know that they know that they coincide, etc.
3 An epistemic-topological approach to agreeing to disagree
The standard set-based approach to interactive epistemology lacks a general framework providing
some formal notion of closeness between events.2 By adding a topological dimension to an epistemic
structure, it is actually possible to introduce a perception of closeness of events into the reasoning
of agents.3 In such an enriched epistemic-topological framework, the reasoning of agents may thus
also depend on topological instead of mere epistemic features of the underlying interactive situation.
2For the specific purpose of dealing with counterfactuals, Lewis [18] and Stalnaker [24] consider closeness between
possible worlds as a primitive in the semantics of their conditional logics. The basic idea is that for every possible world and
every statement, a selection function picks the closest world such that the statement holds true. In contrast to the classical
models of Stalnaker and Lewis, we consider closeness between events; have closeness determined by an underlying topology;
and do not restrict attention concerning closeness to counterfactuals.
3Note that topological spaces can be seen as generalizations of metric spaces. While closeness between elements
is explicitly measured via the respective distance function in metric spaces, it is only implicitly determined by open
neighbourhoods in topological spaces.
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For instance, suppose an agent is reasoning about the weather in London. Intuitively, the event It
is cloudy in London seems to be closer to the event It is raining in London than the event It is sunny
in London. Now, the agent may make identical decisions being informed only of the truth of some
event within a class of close events. In fact, the agent might decide to stay at home not only in the
case of it raining outside, but also in the case of events perceived by him to be similar, i.e. close, such
as it being cloudy outside. In a topologically enriched epistemic framework, the notion of closeness
is induced by the topology.
Note that such an epistemic-topological approach is of descriptive not normative character. Due to
the heterogeneity of real-world agents, different people may have different perceptions of closeness
and ways of reasoning. It therefore seems implausible to claim that there is some kind of universal
topology that represents the correct perception of the event space that agents should hold. In contrast,
different intuitive cognitive-topological patterns of closeness can be formalized and serve as the
agents’perceptions of the event space. Such a descriptive use of topologies is in line with Rubinstein’s
[22] view that topology can be used as a substantial tool to formalize natural intuitions about
closeness.4
In this context, Bach and Cabessa [7, 8] consider Aumann structures equipped with topologies5
on the event space and introduce the operator limit knowledge, which is linked to epistemic features
as well as topological aspects of the event space. More precisely, limit knowledge is defined as the
topological limit of higher-order mutual knowledge.
Deﬁnition 1
Let (,(Ii)i∈I ,p) be an Aumann structure, T a topology on P(), and E an event. If the limit point
of the sequence (Km(E))m>0 is unique, then LK(E) := limm→∞Km(E) is the event that E is limit
knowledge among the set I of agents.
Accordingly, limit knowledge of an event E is constituted by — whenever unique — the limit
point of the sequence of iterated mutual knowledge, and thus linked to both epistemic as well as
topological aspects of the event space. Note that T being a topology on the event space P() means
that T ⊆P(P()). In contrast, a topology U on the state space  means that U ⊆P().
Limit knowledge can be understood as the event which is approached by the sequence of iterated
mutual knowledge, according to the notion of closeness between events provided by a given topology
on the event space.6 Thus, the higher the iterated mutual knowledge, the closer this latter epistemic
event is to limit knowledge.
Note that limit knowledge should not be amalgamated with common knowledge. Indeed, both
operators can be perceived as sharing distinct implicative properties with regards to iterated mutual
knowledge. Common knowledge bears a standard implicative relation in terms of set inclusion to all
4(Cf. Rubinstein [22], p. 390).
5For sake of self-containedness, some basic notions from topology are recalled. Given some set X , a topology T on X
consists of a family of subsets of X, i.e. X ⊆P(X), such that the empty set and X belong to T , and the family T is closed under
finite intersection as well as under arbitrary union. If T is a topology on X , the pair (X,T ) is called topological space, where
the elements of T are called open sets. For any p∈X, an open neighbourhood of p is an open set containing p. Moreover,
given some subset S⊆X, an element p∈X is a limit point of S if every open neighbourhood of p contains some element of S
different from p. Given some sequence s= (xi)i≥0 of elements of X , if the limit point of s is unique, it is denoted by limi→∞xi.
6In our epistemic-topological framework, there exist various ways in which a notion of closeness between events can be
defined based on their open neighbourhoods. For instance, two events could be said to be close, if they violate the so-called
Hausdorff-condition, i.e., if there exist no disjoint neighbourhoods of these two events. Also, degrees of closeness could
possibly be defined in the sense that the more neighbourhoods contain two events, the closer the respective events are to each
other. In case of the considered topology on the event space to be metrizable, there exists a distance function which could
explicitly measure the closeness between events.
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iterated mutual knowledge. In contrast, limit knowledge entertains an implicative relation in terms
of set proximity with iterated mutual knowledge: the higher the iteration, the closer the respective
higher-order mutual knowledge to limit knowledge.
In general, limit knowledge also differs from approximations of common knowledge such as
Monderer and Samet’s [21] common p-belief as well as Rubinstein’s [22] almost common knowledge.
Indeed, common p-belief — as infinitely iterated mutual p belief with p-belief being weaker than
knowledge — and almost common knowledge — as iterated mutual knowledge up to some finite
level only — are both implied by common knowledge, whereas limit knowledge is not.
It is possible to link limit knowledge to reasoning patterns of agents based on closeness of events.
In fact, agents satisfying limit knowledge of some event are in a situation infinitesimally close to
having arbitrarily-high iterated mutual knowledge of this event, and the agents’ reasoning may be
influenced accordingly. Note that a reasoning pattern associated with limit knowledge depends on
the particular topology on the event space, which fixes the closeness relation between events. For
instance, in Section 4 a specific topological structure on the event space is provided, such that limit
knowledge corresponds to Rubinstein’s [22] almost common knowledge. An epistemic-topological
foundation for almost common knowledge is thus provided, which can also be considered a concern
of its own sake independent from agreeing to disagree.
The operator limit knowledge is shown by Bach and Cabessa [7, 8] to be able to provide
relevant epistemic-topological characterizations of solution concepts in games. Despite being based
on the same sequence of higher-order mutual knowledge claims, the distinguished interest of
limit knowledge resides in its capacity to potentially differ from the purely epistemic operator
common knowledge. Notably, it can be proven that such differing situations necessarily require
an infinite event space as well as sequences of higher-order mutual knowledge that are strictly
shrinking.7
In contrast to the purely epistemic operator common knowledge, for which factiveness holds,
i.e. CK(E)⊆E, the epistemic-topological operator limit knowledge does in general not bear this
property.8 However, if the sequence of higher-order mutual knowledge of some event E is not strictly
shrinking, then limit knowledge is equal to common knowledge, and therefore, limit knowledge is
factive, i.e. LK(E)⊆E.9 In particular, limit knowledge is factive in all finite Aumann structures.
Now, the question whether agents with a common prior belief can agree to disagree on their
posterior beliefs is addressed from a topological point of view. The original hypotheses of Aumann’s
result are modified in that the epistemic operator common knowledge is replaced by the epistemic-
topological operator limit knowledge. It is now shown that agents can indeed limit-agree to
disagree.
Theorem 1
There exist an Aumann structure A= (,(Ii)i∈I ,p) equipped with a topology T on the event
space P(), an event E ⊆, and worlds ω,ωˆ∈ such that ω∈LK(⋂i∈I {ω′ ∈ :p(E |Ii(ω′))=
p(E |Ii(ωˆ))}), as well as both p(E |Ii(ωˆ)) =p(E |Ij(ωˆ)) and p(E |Ii(ω)) =p(E |Ij(ω)) for some
agents i,j∈ I .
7Given some event E, the sequence of higher-order mutual knowledge (Km(E))m>0 is called strictly shrinking if Km+1(E)
Km(E) for all m≥0.
8For example, in the proof of Theorem 1 an Aumann structure is constructed, the event space is furnished with a topology,
and an event E′ is considered for which LK(E′) ⊆E′ holds.
9In fact, Bach and Cabessa [8] show that, if limit knowledge and common knowledge are distinct events, then the sequence
of higher-order mutual knowledge is strictly shrinking.
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Figure 2. Illustration of the Aumann structure described in the proof of Theorem 1. The dotted
and dashed sets represent the possibility partitions of Alice and Bob, respectively. The fractions
correspond to the prior probabilities associated to the possible worlds.
Proof. Consider the Aumann structure A= (,(Ii)i∈I ,p), which is illustrated in Figure 2 and where
={ωn :n≥0}, I ={Alice,Bob}, IAlice ={{ω2n,ω2n+1} :n≥0}, IBob ={{ω0}}∪{{ω2n+1,ω2n+2} :
n≥0}, as well as p :→R is given by p(ωn)= 12n+1 for all n≥0. Note that the common prior
belief function p is well defined since
∑
n≥0 12n+1 =1. Now, consider the event E ={ω2n :n≥1},
and the world ω2 ∈. Besides, for sake of notational convenience, let the event ⋂i∈I {ω′ ∈
 :p(E |Ii(ω′))=p(E |Ii(ω2))} be denoted by E′. First of all, observe that p(E |IAlice(ω2))= 23
and p(E |IBob(ω2))= 13 . Moreover, {ω′ ∈ :p(E |IAlice(ω′))=p(E |IAlice(ω2))= 23 }=\{ω0,ω1}
and {ω′ ∈ :p(E |IBob(ω′))=p(E |IBob(ω2))= 13 }=\{ω0}, thus E′ = (\{ω0,ω1})∩(\{ω0})=
\{ω0,ω1}. Furthermore, the definitions of the possibility partitions of Alice and Bob ensure
that Km(E′)=Km(\{ω0,ω1})=\{ω0,ω1,...,ωm+1}, for all m>0. Consequently, the sequence
(Km(E′))m>0 is strictly shrinking and CK(E′)={ω∈ : (∧i∈I Ii)(ω)⊆E′}=∅. Now, consider the
topology T on P() defined by T ={O⊆P() : {ω0,ω1,ω2} ∈O}∪{P()}. Then, the only open
neighbourhood of the event {ω0,ω1,ω2} is P(), and all terms of the sequence (Km(E′))m>0
are contained in P(). Thus (Km(E′))m>0 converges to {ω0,ω1,ω2}. Moreover, for every event
F ∈P() such that F ={ω0,ω1,ω2}, the singleton {F} is open, and since Km+1(E′)Km(E′) for all
m>0, the strictly shrinking sequence (Km(E′))m>0 will never remain in the open neighbourhood
{F} of F from some index onwards. Hence (Km(E′))m>0 does not converge to any such event F.
Therefore, the limit point {ω0,ω1,ω2} of the strictly shrinking sequence (Km(E′))m>0 is unique, and
LK(E′)= limm→∞Km(E′)={ω0,ω1,ω2}. The event E′ and its limit point LK(E′) are also illustrated
in Figure 2. Next, consider the world ω1. Note that ω1 ∈LK(E′). Also, observe that p(E |IAlice(ω2))=
2
3 = 13 =p(E |IBob(ω2)) as well as p(E |IAlice(ω1))=0 = 13 =p(E |IBob(ω1)). Finally, taking ω=ω1
and ωˆ=ω2 concludes the proof. 
The preceding theorem counters Aumann’s impossibility result in the sense of showing that agents
can limit-agree to disagree. More precisely, agents may hold distinct actual posterior beliefs, while at
the same time satisfying limit knowledge of their posteriors being equal to the specific values induced
by a given auxiliary world. Hence, agents may agree in the sense of satisfying limit knowledge of their
posteriors, while at the same time disagree in the sense of actually having different posterior beliefs.
The interactive situation depicted in the proof of Theorem 1 shows that agreeing to disagree
becomes possible when common knowledge is substituted by limit knowledge. Thus, Aumann’s
impossibility result no longer holds when moving to a topologically enriched context. In such an
epistemic-topological framework, agents can now be seen to have cognitive access to a further
dimension in their reasoning that permits them to agree to disagree on their posterior beliefs. More
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precisely, the agents are in a limit situation of having higher-order mutual knowledge of their
posteriors, which, in connection with the particular notion of closeness provided by the topology,
leads them to actually possess different posterior beliefs.
Note that the epistemic model constructed in the proof of Theorem 1 could actually be strengthened
in the sense of generating different posterior beliefs for the agents not only at some but at all
worlds contained in limit knowledge. For instance, taking as topology on the event space T ={O⊆
P() : {ωn :n>0} ∈O}∪{P()} yields LK(⋂i∈I {ω′ ∈ :p(E |Ii(ω′))=p(E |Ii∈I (ωˆ))})=\{ω0},
and hence different posterior beliefs for Alice and Bob at all worlds in \{ω0}. More generally,
it would actually be possible to make limit knowledge correspond to any event F by equipping the
event space with the corresponding excluded point topology T ={O⊆P() :F ∈O}∪{P()}. This
topology does not have any intuitive interpretation, but has merely be chosen as to keep the proof of
Theorem 1 as simple as possible. However, in Section 4, a topological structure on the event space is
given, which is based on intuitive properties and under which limit-agreeing to disagree also obtains.
The proof of Theorem 1 illustrates an epistemic situation in which limit knowledge of the agents’
posterior beliefs holds concurrently with distinct actual posterior beliefs of the agents, in the particular
case of the agents’ posterior beliefs being nowhere common knowledge in the structure. Hence,
the impression might arise that the relevance of limit knowledge for a possible disagreement only
occurs in epistemic models in which common knowledge of the agents’ posterior beliefs does not
hold anywhere at all. However, it can be shown that the possibility of such a disagreement may also
emerge in situations in which common knowledge of the agents’posteriors actually holds somewhere
in the structure. Hence, disagreement induced by limit knowledge does not depend on the existence
or non-existence of common knowledge of the agents’ posteriors beliefs in the epistemic model.
From an interpretative point of view, limit knowledge of the agents’ posteriors might be consistent
with a disagreement between the agents irrespective of whether these posteriors would have been
publicly disclosed somewhere, or not. Also, the proof of Theorem 1 describes an interactive situation
in which limit knowledge of distinct agents’ posterior beliefs obtains simultaneously with differing
actual posterior beliefs of the agents. Thus, the impression might arise that a possible disagreement
could only be elicited by limit knowledge of already distinct posteriors. However, it can be shown that
agents may actually disagree, while having limit knowledge of identical posterior beliefs. Countering
the preceding two possible impressions, the following example indeed depicts an epistemic situation
in which a disagreement on the agents’ actual posterior beliefs is induced by limit knowledge of
identical posterior beliefs, while common knowledge of these posteriors also holds somewhere in
the structure.
Example 1
Consider the Aumann structure A= (,(Ii)i∈I ,p), where ={ωn :n≥0}, I ={Alice,Bob}, IAlice =
{{ω0}, {ω1}} ∪ {{ω2n, ω2n+1} :n>0}, IBob ={{ω0}} ∪ {{ω2n+1,ω2n+2} :n≥0}, and p :→R
is given by p(ωn)= 12n+1 for all n≥0. This structure is illustrated in Figure 3. Note that the
common prior belief function p is well defined since
∑
n≥0 12n+1 =1. Now, consider the event
E ={ω1} and the world ω0. Besides, for sake of notational convenience, let the event ⋂i∈I {ω′ ∈
 :p(E |Ii(ω′))=p(E |Ii(ω0))} be denoted by E′. First of all, observe that p(E |IAlice(ω0))=
0 as well as p(E |IBob(ω0))=0. Moreover, {ω′ ∈ :p(E |IAlice(ω′))=p(E |IAlice(ω0))=0}=\
{ω1} and {ω′ ∈ :p(E |IBob(ω′))=p(E |IBob(ω0))=0}=\{ω1,ω2}, whence E′ = (\{ω1})∩(\
{ω1,ω2})=\{ω1,ω2}. Furthermore, the definitions of the possibility partitions of Alice and Bob
ensure that Km(E′)=Km(\{ω1,ω2})=\{ω1,ω2,...,ωm+2}, for all m>0. Consequently, the
sequence (Km(E′))m>0 is strictly shrinking. Now, consider the topology T on P() defined by
T ={O⊆P() : {ω1,ω2} ∈O}∪{P()}. Then, the only open neighbourhood of the event {ω1,ω2}
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Figure 3. Illustration of the Aumann structure used in Example 1. The dotted and dashed sets
represent the possibility partitions of Alice and Bob, respectively. The fractions correspond to the
prior probabilities associated with the possible worlds. Note that E′ =E′0∪E′1.
is P(), and all terms of the sequence (Km(E′))m>0 are contained in P(). Thus (Km(E′))m>0
converges to {ω1,ω2}. Moreover, for every event F ∈P() such that F ={ω1,ω2}, the singleton {F}
is open, and since Km+1(E′)Km(E′) for all m>0, the strictly shrinking sequence (Km(E′))m>0 will
never remain in the open neighbourhood {F}of F from some index onwards. Hence (Km(E′))m>0 does
not converge to any such event F. Therefore, the limit point {ω1,ω2} of the strictly shrinking sequence
(Km(E′))m>0 is unique, and LK(E′)= limm→∞Km(E′)={ω1,ω2}. Besides, note that CK(E′)=
{ω∈ : (∧i∈I Ii)(ω)⊆E′}={ω0}. Next, consider the world ω1. Observe that ω1 ∈LK(E′) and
p(E |IAlice(ω1))=1 = 23 =p(E |IBob(ω1)). Thus, CK(E′) =∅, and world ω1 satisfies both conditions
ω1 ∈LK(E′) as well as p(E |IAlice(ω1)) = p(E |IBob(ω1)). ♣
Observe that the structure of the two agents’ possibility partitions in the proof of Theorem 1 and
Example 1 is similar to the structure of the partitions in Rubinstein’s [22] electronic mail game.
Indeed, the resemblance lies in the existence of an infinite chain-type pattern which consecutively
links information cells of the two agents by a single world in the intersection of the respective two
cells, and where each information cell only contains two worlds. In our framework, such a pattern
ensures that the sequence of iterated mutual knowledge is strictly shrinking, which is a necessary
condition for limit knowledge to differ from common knowledge.
More generally, observe that all possible ways of limit-agreeing to disagree can actually be
classified into three mutually exclusive cases.
First of all, disagreement on the agents’ actual posteriors may be induced by limit knowledge of
already distinct posteriors, while common knowledge of these posteriors is empty. Such agreeing to
disagree is illustrated by the interactive situation depicted in the proof of Theorem 1.
Secondly, disagreement on the agents’ actual posteriors can be induced by limit knowledge of
identical posteriors, while common knowledge of these posteriors is non-empty. Such agreeing to
disagree is illustrated in Example 1.
Thirdly, disagreement on the agents’ actual posteriors can also be induced by limit knowledge
of identical agents’ posteriors, while common knowledge of these posteriors is empty. To see this,
consider the Aumann structure given in the proof of Theorem 1, the event E ={ω0}, the world
ω2, and the topology on the event space T ={O⊆P() : {ω0,ω1} ∈O}∪{P()}. It thus follows
that p(E |IAlice(ω2))=p(E |IBob(ω2))=0 and E′ =
⋂
i∈I {ω′ ∈ :p(E |Ii(ω′))=p(E |Ii(ω2))}=\
{ω0,ω1}. Then, CK(E′)=∅ and LK(E′)={ω0,ω1}, as well as bothω1 ∈LK(E′) and p(E |IAlice(ω1))=
2
3 =0=p(E |IBob(ω1)).
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The fourth possibility of a disagreement on the agents’ actual posteriors based on limit knowledge
of already distinct posteriors and with non-emptiness of common knowledge of these posteriors is
excluded by Aumann’s agreement theorem.
Besides, in the epistemic-topological situations described in the proof of Theorem 1 as well as
in Example 1, limit knowledge is not factive, i.e. the relation LK(E′)⊆E′ does not hold for the
considered event E′. However, the possibility to limit-agree to disagree established in Theorem 1
does not directly follow from the non-factiveness of limit knowledge. We now show that agents can
limit-agree to disagree with factive limit knowledge, and that in this case, the distinct actual posteriors
are induced by limit knowledge of already distinct posteriors as well as common knowledge of these
posteriors being empty.
Lemma 2
There exist an Aumann structure A= (,(Ii)i∈I ,p) equipped with a topology T on the event space
P(), an event E ⊆, and worlds ω,ωˆ∈ such that LK(⋂i∈I {ω′ ∈ :p(E |Ii(ω′))=p(E |Ii(ωˆ))})⊆⋂
i∈I {ω′ ∈ :p(E |Ii(ω′))=p(E |Ii(ωˆ))}, ω∈LK(
⋂
i∈I {ω′ ∈ :p(E |Ii(ω′))=p(E |Ii(ωˆ))}), as well
as p(E |Ii(ω)) =p(E |Ij(ω)) for some agents i,j∈ I . In this case, CK(⋂i∈I {ω′ ∈ :p(E |Ii(ω′))=
p(E |Ii(ωˆ))})=∅ and p(E |Ii(ωˆ)) =p(E |Ij(ωˆ)) for some agents i,j∈ I .
Proof. First, the existence of an Aumann structure and a topology satisfying the postulated
properties is established. Consider the Aumann structure A and the events E and E′ given in
the proof of Theorem 1. Let the topology T on the event space P() be defined by T ={O⊆
P() : {ω2} ∈O}∪{P()}. It follows that LK(E′)= limm→∞Km(E′)={ω2}⊆\{ω0,ω1}=E′, and
p(E |IAlice(ω2))= 23 = 13 =p(E |IBob(ω2)). Taking ω= ωˆ=ω2 concludes the first part of the proof.
Next, it is shown that if an Aumann structure and a topology satisfy the postulated properties,
then the corresponding posteriors are distinct and common knowledge of these posteriors is thus
empty. Consider some Aumann structure A= (,(Ii)i∈I ,p), some topology T on the event space
P(), some event E, and some worlds ω,ωˆ∈ satisfying the postulated conditions. Let the event⋂
i∈I {ω′ ∈ :p(E |Ii(ω′))=p(E |Ii(ωˆ))} be denoted by E′. Since ω∈LK(E′) and LK(E′)⊆E′ both
hold by the postulated conditions, it follows that ω∈E′, i.e. p(E |Ii(ω))=p(E |Ii(ωˆ)), for all i∈ I .
Moreover, as the postulated conditions ensure that p(E |Ii(ω)) =p(E |Ij(ω)) for some agents i,j∈ I , it
is the case that p(E |Ii(ωˆ)) =p(E |Ij(ωˆ)) also obtains for some agents i,j∈ I . Now, the contraposition
of Aumann’s Agreement Theorem (Version 1) directly implies that CK(E′)=∅. 
Finally, agreeing to disagree with limit knowledge can be graphically illustrated for the case of two
agents. A particular interactive situation is represented in Figure 4. Again, as in Figure 1, the event
space is partitioned in equivalence classes of worlds inducing a same posterior belief profile in some
underlying event E. Hence, the event E′ denotes the equivalence class of worlds inducing the same
posterior beliefs for all agents as at the auxiliary world ωˆ. In the considered interactive situation,
the event CK(E′) is non-empty, and the topology on the event space implies that the event LK(E′)
is well-defined, distinct from CK(E′), and not even included in the event E′ itself. Since CK(E′) is
non-empty, Aumann’s agreement theorem ensures that the agents’ posterior beliefs induced by the
auxiliary world ωˆ coincide, and thus any world in the equivalence class E′ also induces identical
posterior beliefs for all agents. Therefore, the posterior beliefs that are both common knowledge as
well as limit knowledge are identical for all agents. Moreover, note that, as ω1 lies in the equivalence
class E′, the agents’ posterior beliefs at world ω1 are the same as the ones induced by the auxiliary
world ωˆ, and thus all identical. Consequently, since ω1 is also contained in both CK(E′) as well as in
LK(E′), agents do agree on identical posteriors at ω1, both with common knowledge and with limit
knowledge. Besides, the position of the world ω2 relative to ω1 in Figure 4 ensures that Alice and
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Figure 4. Illustration of limit-agreeing to disagree for the case of two agents.
Bob hold distinct posterior beliefs at ω2. Similarly, the agents have different posterior beliefs at ω3.
Since ω2 and ω3 are contained in LK(E′), agents actually agree to disagree with limit knowledge at
both worlds. Observe that, although being based on limit knowledge of the same posterior beliefs,
the disagreements at ω2 and ω3 differ. Furthermore, both such disagreements are in fact induced by
limit knowledge of equal posteriors, as the posteriors of Alice and Bob coincide throughout E′.
4 A representative example
The extension of the standard set-based approach to interactive epistemology with a topological
dimension has been shown to enable the possibility for agents to limit-agree to disagree on their
posterior beliefs. The question then arises whether limit-agreeing to disagree remains possible in
interactive situations, where the topologies are based on intuitive properties. A topology describing
a specific agents’ perception of the event space is now presented. Accordingly, lower iterated mutual
knowledge up to some finite level is grasped by the agents in a more refined manner than higher
iterations from that level onwards. Such a property seems natural, since real world agents typically
only have distinguished cognitive access to iterated knowledge claims up to some finite level, in
contrast to the idealized agents that can equally well conceive of any layer of the complete hierarchy
of interactive knowledge. For this intuitive topology it is then shown that agreeing to disagree with
limit knowledge is possible. Besides, this intuitive topology establishes that limit knowledge is
identical to iterated mutual knowledge for some finite level m, i.e. it is equal to almost common
knowledge, a concept due to Rubinstein [22]. The example could thus also be seen as a contribution
to the literature of bounded reasoning. However, it differs from models of k-level reasoning, which
express a specific and different kind of finite level reasoning in the particular context of games.10
Towards this purpose, consider an Aumann structure A = (, (Ii)i∈I , p) and an event E.
Furthermore, for any world ω∈, let E′ω denote the event consisting of all worlds that induce the
same posterior beliefs in E for all agents as at ω, i.e. E′ω =
⋂
i∈I {ω′ ∈ :p(E |Ii(ω′))=p(E |Ii(ω))}.
10Loosely speaking, k-level reasoning restricts a belief hierarchy in the particular context of games such that random play
is assumed at the first level, and only best responses to the respective preceding levels are admitted at the iterated levels up
to some finite level k. In fact, Crawford et al. [12] provide a recent overview on the literature of k-level reasoning and other
theories of finite reasoning.
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Figure 5. Illustration of the topology TE,m∗ .
Note that constancy of the agents’ posterior beliefs in E yields an equivalence relation on the set of
possible worlds, and hence every E′ω represents an equivalence class of worlds. Consequently, the
collection C={E′ω :ω∈} of all equivalence classes of worlds that induce a same posterior belief
profile forms a partition of . Given some event E and some index m∗>0, the epistemically-based
topology TE,m∗ is defined as the topology on the event space P() generated by the subbase
{{Km(E′ω) :m≥0} :ω∈}
∪ {P()\{Km(E′ω) :m≥0 and ω∈}}
∪ {{Km(E′ω)} :0≤m<m∗ and ω∈}
∪ {{Km∗+j(E′ω) :0< j≤n} :n>0 and ω∈}.
The topology TE,m∗ is illustrated in Figure 5, where the infinite sequence (Km(E′ω))m≥0 is
represented by a horizontal sequence of points for each ω∈, and open sets of the subbase by
circle-type shapes around these points. In this topology, the closeness relation between events is
represented by means of the T0 and T2 separation properties.11
The topology TE,m∗ reveals a specific agent perception of the event space, according to which the
agents express a more refined distinction between the m∗ first iterated mutual knowledge of their
11Given a topological space (A,T ), two points in A are called T2-separable, if there exist two disjoint T -open
neighbourhoods of these two points. Moreover, two points in A are called T0-separable, if there exists a T -open set containing
precisely one of these two points. Note that T2-separability implies T0-separability. In fact, two events that are T0-separable
but not T2-separable can be said to be closer to each other than two events that are both T0-separable as well as T2-separable.
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posterior beliefs in E than between the remaining ones. This specific perception is formally reflected
by two separation properties satisfied by the topology TE,m∗ .
First, given two events X and Y , if X and Y are two distinct terms of the same sequence
(Km(E′ω))m>0, such that X =Km1 (E′ω) and Y =Km2 (E′ω), for some ω∈ and m1,m2 <m∗, then
X and Y are T2-separable, and therefore also T0-separable. Secondly, if X and Y are two different
elements of the same sequence (Km(E′ω))m>0, such that X =Km1 (E′ω) and Y =Km2 (E′ω), for some
ω∈ and m1,m2 >m∗, then X and Y are T0-separable, yet not T2-separable. According to these
two separation properties, agents have access to a more refined distinction between the m∗ first
iterated knowledge claims of their posterior beliefs in E than between the iterated mutual knowledge
claims of order strictly larger than m∗. In other words, iterated mutual knowledge claims are only
precisely discerned up to a given amount of iterations, and thereafter the higher iterations become less
distinguishable for the agents. Also, from a bounded rationality point of view, the agents’ perception
of higher-order mutual knowledge due to the topology TE,m∗ reflects that people typically lose track
from some iteration level onwards when reasoning about higher-order mutual knowledge.
Furthermore, the topologyTE,m∗ notably satisfies the following epistemic-topological property: for
any event E′ω, if the sequence (Km(E′ω))m>0 is strictly shrinking, then LK(E′ω)=Km∗ (E′ω). Indeed,
suppose that the sequence (Km(E′ω))m>0 is strictly shrinking. Then, by definition of TE,m∗ , the
only open neighbourhoods of Km∗ (E′ω) are P() and {Km(E′ω) :m≥0}. Since both sets contain
all terms of the sequence (Km(E′ω))m>0, it follows that Km
∗ (E′ω) is a limit point of the sequence
(Km(E′ω))m>0. Moreover, it can be shown that this limit point is actually unique.12 Therefore,





∗ (E′ω), and hence CK(E′ω) =LK(E′ω).
Note that if the event space is equipped with the topology TE,m∗ , the epistemic-topological event
LK(E′) actually coincides with Rubinstein’s [22] notion of almost common knowledge if m∗ is large,
i.e. LK(E′)=Km∗ (E′). Thus, agents with topological mental states according to TE,m∗ who have limit
knowledge actually reason in line with almost common knowledge. More precisely, if agents can only
accurately conceive of higher-order interactive knowledge up to some fixed level, then they reason
with limit knowledge if and only if they reason with almost common knowledge up to that level only.
In fact, the connection between cognitive-topologically perceiving iterated knowledge distinctly only
up to some finite level and epistemically reasoning in line with almost common knowledge up to
that level does seem natural. Thus, the topology TE,m∗ provides an intuitive topological foundation
for Rubinstein’s almost common knowledge in terms of the agents’ cognitive perception of the event
space.
Finally, the following example describes an interactive situation, in which the intutive topology
TE,m∗ provides a possibility for the agents to agree to disagree on their posterior beliefs with limit
knowledge.
Example 2
Consider the Aumann structure A= (,(Ii)i∈I ,p), where ={ωn :n≥0}, I ={Alice,Bob}, IAlice
= {{ω0}, {ω1, ω2}, {ω3, ω4, ω5, ω6}, {ω7, ω8, ω9}} ∪ {{ω2n, ω2n+1} : n≥5}, IBob =
{{ω0,ω1,ω2,ω3,ω4}, {ω5,ω6, ω7,ω8}} ∪ {{ω2n+1,ω2n+2} :n≥4}, and p :→R is given by p(ωn)=
1
2n+1 for all n≥0. Also, consider the event E ={ω1,ω5}∪{ω2n :n≥1} and the world ω10. Besides, for
sake of notational convenience, let the event
⋂
i∈I {ω′ ∈ :p(E |Ii(ω′))=p(E |Ii(ω10))} be denoted
by E′. First of all, observe that the computation of the posterior beliefs of Alice and Bob gives a
variety of distinct values for the first ten worlds {ω0,ω1,...,ω9}, as well as p(E |IAlice(ωn))= 23
12A detailed proof of this fact is provided in Appendix.
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and p(E |IBob(ωn))= 13 , for all n≥10. It follows that {ω′ ∈ :p(E |IAlice(ω′))=p(E |IAlice(ω10))}=
\{ω0,ω1,...,ω9} and {ω′ ∈ :p(E |IBob(ω′))=p(E |IBob(ω10))}=\{ω0,ω1,...,ω8}, thus E′ =
( \ {ω0, ω1, ..., ω9}) ∩ ( \ {ω0, ω1, ..., ω8}) =  \ {ω0, ω1, ..., ω9}. Moreover, the definitions of
the possibility partitions of Alice and Bob ensure that Km(E′)=\{ω0,ω1,...,ωm+9}, for all m>0.
Consequently, the sequence (Km(E′))m>0 is strictly shrinking and CK(E′)=⋂m>0Km(E′)=∅.
Now, let m∗>0 be some index and suppose that P() is equipped with the topology TE,m∗ .
Since the sequence (Km(E′))m>0 is strictly shrinking, the definition of this topology ensures that
LK(E′)=Km∗ (E′)=\{ω0,ω1,...,ωm∗+9}. Consequently, the computations of the posterior beliefs
of Alice and Bob give p(E |IAlice(ω))= 23 and p(E |IBob(ω))= 13 , for all ω∈LK(E′). In other words,
for all ω∈LK(E′), it holds that p(E |IAlice(ω)) =p(E |IBob(ω)). ♣
In the preceding example, a situation is provided where agents with an intuitive perception of
the event space do agree to disagree. Yet, as limit knowledge coincides with Rubinstein’s almost
common knowledge, the example also shows that Aumann’s agreement theorem is not robust in the
sense that agents having almost common knowledge of posteriors can hold distinct posterior beliefs.
5 Conclusion
In a topologically extended epistemic model, agents have been shown to be able to limit-agree to
disagree. More precisely, if Bayesian agents have a common prior belief as well as limit knowledge
of their posteriors beliefs, then their actual posterior beliefs may indeed differ. Our possibility result
contrasts with Aumann’s impossibility theorem. Actually, limit-agreeing to disagree is possible in
interactive situations enriched by some topology that reveals a specific cogent agent perception
of the event space. Indeed, our representative example, in which limit knowledge coincides with
Rubinstein’s [22] almost common knowledge, illustrates the non-robustness of Aumann’s agreement
theorem in the sense that the posteriors of agents holding approximate common knowledge of
posteriors may actually differ.
The possibility of agreeing to disagree with limit knowledge — as finitely iterated mutual
knowledge — in a topologically enriched epistemic structure can be seen in the context of the growing
literature on k-level reasoning and other theories on bounded reasoning. It would be intriguing for
future work to investigate such models of finite thinking from an epistemic-topological point of view.
An interesting recent point of departure could be Kets’ [16] and [17] theory of finite depth reasoning.
Accordingly, the language of game-playing agents is restricted such that they can only reason about
higher-order beliefs up to some level k. This is related to our intuitive topology in Section 4, which
also restricts agents’ reasoning to finitely iterated mutual knowledge. Even though any higher-order
mutual knowledge is — in contrast to Kets’ models — part of the agents’ language, they cannot
conceive of it in a precise but only in a ‘blurred’ way. Hence, a relevant question would be what
topological conditions need to generally be invoked on standard epistemic structures for games, such
that the players’ reasoning remains restricted as in Kets’ style type spaces.
Besides, note that it is impossible for agents to limit-agree to disagree in the case of finite Aumann
structures as well as in the case of infinite Aumann structures where the sequence of iterated mutual
knowledge is not strictly shrinking. Indeed, as shown in Bach and Cabessa [8], in such cases,
the epistemic-topological operator limit knowledge necessarily coincides with the purely epistemic
operator common knowledge, and consequently, Aumann’s impossibility result does apply.
The epistemic-topological operator limit knowledge is based on the notion of set proximity in
contrast to the purely epistemic operator common knowledge which is based on set inclusion. Indeed,
while the latter notion corresponds to logical implication, the former does not comply with any
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purely logical concept, but relates to a whole variety of possible cognitive perceptions induced by
the respective topology under consideration. Depending on the underlying topology, a given notion
of set proximity between events may reflect physical properties of these events, but also mental
representations on the event space such as in our representative example in Section 4. Therefore, as
opposed to common knowledge which only captures a single epistemic phenomenon, limit knowledge
is able to represent a variety of possible epistemic-topological phenomena as a function on the
particular topology on the event space. In this sense, limit knowledge can be viewed as some kind of
generalized epistemic-topological concept which, for every possible underlying topology, becomes
an operator with precise meaning.
Actually, the topological approach to set-based interactive epistemology, in which topologies model
agents’ perceptions of closeness between events, can be used to describe various agent reasoning
patterns that do not only depend on mere epistemic but also on topological features of the underlying
interactive situation.
In general, the epistemic-topological approach is of descriptive and not normative character. Due
to the heterogeneity of real-world agents and similar to the variety of solution concepts in games,
it appears plausible to study distinct topological perception patterns of the event space and their
implications for reasoning via the epistemic-topological operator limit knowledge.
Moreover, we envision the construction of a more general epistemic-topological framework —
topological Aumann structures — comprising topologies not only on the event space but also on the
state space. Such an extension permits an explicit consideration of a notion of closeness between
events and between worlds, enabling us to model common agent perceptions of the event and state
spaces as well as their interconnection.13 In particular, it might be of distinguished interest to base
topologies on first principles such as epistemic axioms or natural closeness properties. In line with
this perspective, the topology provided in Section 4 reflects the natural agent perception for which
iterated mutual knowledge becomes imprecise from some level onwards.
Besides, in order to model subjective rather than common agent perceptions of the event and
state spaces, the epistemic-topological framework envisioned here could be amended by assigning
specific and potentially distinct topologies to every agent. A collective topology reflecting a common
closeness perception could then be constructed on the basis of the particular agent topologies, and
limit knowledge be defined in such a global topological context. For instance, by providing a topology
that is coarser than each agent’s one, the meet topology could be used as a representative collective
topology. Alternatively, an agent-specific operator limit knowledge could be defined with respect to
each particular topology, and mutual limit knowledge as their intersection then be considered.
Finally, in a general epistemic-topological framework, various issues can be addressed. For
example, the possibility of agents’ agreeing to disagree with limit knowledge can be further analysed
for other epistemically-based as well as agent specific topologies. Furthermore, analogously to
the epistemic program in game theory that attempts to provide epistemic foundations for solution
concepts, an epistemic-topological approach could generate epistemic-topological foundations for
solution concepts. In addition, it could be attempted to develop a theory of counterfactuals in set-
based interactive epistemology founded on a notion of similarity of worlds or events provided by
topologies on the state or event space, respectively.
13Note that similar considerations also arise in epistemic logical frameworks such as in Dégremont and Roy [13]. Since
the plausibility orderings in their framework could not only be defined on the states but also on the propositions, which are
events from a semantic point of view, it could be of interest to analyse different — intuitive — ways of deriving plausibility
orderings on propositions from the plausibility orderings on the states, or to more generally impose intuitive criteria on such
orderings.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. Firstly, we show that CKmeet(E)⊆CKinter(E). By definition, CKmeet(E) is the
union of the cells of the meet
∧
i∈I Ii that are included in E. Since the meet
∧
i∈I Ii is coarser than each
agent’s possibility partition, the event CKmeet(E) can thus be written as a union of information cells
for each agent i∈ I , i.e. for all i∈ I , there exists a set Fi ⊆ such that CKmeet(E)=⋃ω′∈Fi Ii(ω′). It
follows that Ki(CKmeet(E)) = Ki(⋃ω′∈Fi Ii(ω′)) =
⋃
ω′∈Fi Ii(ω′) = CKmeet(E), for all i∈ I . Hence,
K(CKmeet(E)) =⋂i∈I Ki(CKmeet(E)) =
⋂
i∈I CKmeet(E) = CKmeet(E). It follows by induction that
Km (CKmeet (E)) = CKmeet (E), for all m>0. Hence, CKinter (CKmeet(E)) = ⋂m>0 Km(CKmeet
(E)) =⋂m>0 CKmeet (E) = CKmeet (E), which shows that CKmeet(E) is a fixed point of the CKinter
operator. Finally, since the operator CKinter is monotone with respect to set inclusion and since
CKmeet(E)⊆E, it follows that CKmeet(E)=CKinter(CKmeet(E))⊆CKinter(E). Secondly, we show
that CKinter(E)⊆CKmeet(E). As a preliminary claim, we prove by induction on n∈N that, for any
ω,ω∗ ∈, if both ω∗ ∈E and there exists a sequence of n+1 possibility cells (Ik)nk=0 such that ω∈I0,
ω∗ ∈In, andIk ∩Ik+1 =∅ for all 0≤k <n, thenω ∈Kn+1(E). First of all, for the case n=0, letω,ω∗ ∈
 and I0 be a possibility cell such that ω,ω∗ ∈I0, and ω∗ ∈E. Since ω∈I0, the cell I0 can be written
as Ii0 (ω), where i0 ∈ I denotes the agent to whom the cell I0 belongs. Also, ω∗ ∈I0 =Ii0 (ω) and
ω∗ ∈E imply that Ii0 (ω) ⊆E. It follows that ω ∈Ki0 (E) and hence ω ∈
⋂
i∈I Ki(E)=K(E)=K1(E).
Now, assume that the claim holds true for some n=m. Let ω,ω∗ ∈ and let (Ik)m+1k=0 be a sequence
of m+2 possibility cells such that ω∗ ∈E, ω∈I0, ω∗ ∈Im+1, and Ik ∩Ik+1 =∅ for all 0≤k <m+1.
SinceI0∩I1 =∅, there exists some worldω′ ∈I0∩I1. Now consider the sequence of m+1 possibility
cells (Jk)mk=0 defined by Jk =Ik+1 for all 0≤k ≤m. This sequence satisfies ω′ ∈J0, ω∗ ∈Jm, and
Jk ∩Jk+1 =∅ for all 0≤k <m. By the induction hypothesis, it follows that ω′ ∈Km+1(E). Moreover,
since ω′ ∈I0, the cell I0 can be written as Ii0 (ω′), where i0 ∈ I denotes the agent to whom the cell
I0 belongs. Hence, ω′ ∈I0 =Ii0 (ω) and ω′ ∈Km+1(E) imply that Ii0 (ω) ⊆Km+1(E). It follows that
ω ∈Ki0 (Km+1(E)) and hence ω ∈
⋂
i∈I Ki(Km+1(E))=K(Km+1(E))=Km+2(E), which completes
the proof of the preliminary claim. Now, let ω ∈CKmeet(E). By the definition of CKmeet(E), it holds
that (∧i∈I Ii)(ω) ⊆E. Since the meet
∧
i∈I Ii is the finest partition coarser than all agents’ possibility
partitions, the cell (∧i∈I Ii)(ω) can be written as a union of consecutively intersecting distinct cells,
i.e. there exists an index set K ⊆N and a sequence of possibility cells (Ik)k∈K such that (
∧
i∈I Ii)(ω)=⋃
k∈K Ik , as well as ω∈I0 and Ik−1∩Ik =∅, for all k ∈K \{0}. Note that any two consecutive terms
of the sequence (Ik)k∈K actually belong to distinct agents, since Ik−1∩Ik =∅ ensures that Ik−1
and Ik are not in a same agent’s possibility partition. As (
∧
i∈I Ii)(ω) ⊆E, there exists a world ω∗




k∈K Ik , there exists
an index l∈K such that ω∗ ∈Il. Therefore, ω∗ ∈E, and the sequence of l+1 possibility cells (Ik)lk=0
satisfies ω∈I0, ω∗ ∈Il, as well as Ik ∩Ik+1 =∅, for all 0≤k < l. By the preliminary claim, it thus
follows that ω ∈Kl+1(E). Hence, ω ∈⋂m>0Km(E)=CKinter(E), which concludes the proof. 
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Proof of Aumann’s Agreement Theorem (Version 1). Let ωˆ∈ be such that CK(⋂ni=1{ω′ ∈ :
p(E |Ii(ω′))=p(E |Ii(ωˆ))}) =∅, and for sake of notational convenience let the event ⋂ni=1{ω′ ∈
 :p(E |Ii(ω′))=p(E |Ii(ωˆ))} be denoted by E′. Consider a world ω∈CK(E′) and some agent
i∗ ∈{1,2,...,n}.As the meet∧ni=1Ii is coarser than agent’s i∗ possibility partition, the cell
∧n
i=1Ii(ω)





ω′∈Ai∗ Ii∗ (ω′), and for all ω1,ω2 ∈Ai∗ , if ω1 =ω2, then Ii∗ (ω1) =Ii∗ (ω2). Since
ω∈CK(E′), the meet definition of common knowledge ensures that∧ni=1Ii(ω)⊆E′. By the definition
of the event E′ it then follows that p(E |Ii∗ (ωˆ))=p(E |Ii∗ (ω′)), for all ω′ ∈Ai∗ . Thus, p(E∩Ii∗ (ω′))=
p(E |Ii∗ (ωˆ))·p(Ii∗ (ω′)), for all ω′ ∈Ai∗ . Summing over the worlds in Ai∗ yields the following
equation of sums
∑
ω′∈Ai∗ p(E∩Ii∗ (ω′))=p(E |Ii∗ (ωˆ))·
∑
ω′∈Ai∗ p(Ii∗ (ω′)). By countable additivity
of the probability measure p, pairwise disjointness of the events E∩Ii∗ (ω′) for all ω′ ∈Ai∗ , and














The equation of sums can then be written as p(E∩∧ni=1Ii(ω))=p(E |Ii∗ (ωˆ))·p(
∧n
i=1Ii(ω)),
thence p(E |Ii∗ (ωˆ))=p(E∩∧ni=1Ii(ω))/p(
∧n
i=1Ii(ω)). Since i∗ has been arbitrarily chosen, the
latter equality holds for every agent i∈{1,2,...,n}. Therefore, p(E |I1(ωˆ))=p(E |I2(ωˆ))=···=p(E |
In(ωˆ))=p(E∩∧ni=1Ii(ω))/p(
∧n
i=1Ii(ω)), which concludes the proof. 
Proof of Aumann’s Agreement Theorem (Version 2). Again, for sake of notational convenience,
let the event
⋂n
i=1{ω′ ∈ :p(E |Ii(ω′))=p(E |Ii(ωˆ))} be denoted by E′. Since ω∈CK(E′), it holds
that ω∈E′. Observe that the definition of the event E′ ensures that p(E |Ii(ω))=p(E |Ii(ωˆ)) for all
agents i∈{1,2,...,n}. Also, Theorem 2 implies that p(E |I1(ωˆ))=p(E |I2(ωˆ))=···=p(E |In(ωˆ)).
Therefore, p(E |I1(ω))=p(E |I2(ω))=···=p(E |In(ω)). 
Proof of the uniqueness of the limit point of the sequence (Km(E′ω))m>0. To see that this limit
point is actually unique, consider F ∈P() such that F =Km∗ (E′ω). Then either F =Km(E′ω′ ) for
some m<m∗ and some ω′ ∈, or F =Km(E′
ω′ ) for some m>m∗ and some ω′ ∈, or F =Km
∗ (E′
ω′ )
for some ω′ =ω, or F =Km(E′
ω′ ) for all m≥0 and all ω′ ∈. These four mutually exclusive cases
are now considered in turn. First of all, if F =Km(E′
ω′ ) for some m<m∗ and some ω′ ∈, then{Km(E′
ω′ )} is an open neighbourhood of F. Since the sequence (Km(E′ω))m>0 is strictly shrinking,
it can then not be the case that the singleton open neighbourhood {Km(E′
ω′ )} of F contains all
terms of the sequence (Km(E′ω))m>0 from some index onwards. Therefore F is not a limit point
of the sequence (Km(E′ω))m>0. Secondly, if F =Km(E′ω′ ) for some m>m∗ and some ω′ ∈, then
{Km∗+j(E′
ω′ ) :0< j≤m−m∗} is an open neighbourhood of F. Since the set {Km
∗+j(E′
ω′ ) :0< j≤
m−m∗} is finite, F cannot be a limit point of the sequence (Km(E′ω))m>0. Thirdly, if F =Km∗ (E′ω′ )
for some ω′ =ω, then {Kn(E′




ω′ )=F, it directly follows that E′ω =E′ω′ . Yet since C={E′ω′′ :ω′′ ∈} is a partition of , it
holds that E′ω∩E′ω′ =∅. Moreover, as Km(E′ω)⊆E′ω for all m≥0, and Kn(E′ω′ )⊆E′ω′ for all n≥0, as
well as E′ω∩E′ω′ =∅, it follows that Km(E′ω) =Kn(E′ω′ ) for all m,n≥0. Thus the open neighbourhood{Kn(E′
ω′ ) :n≥0} of F contains no term of the sequence (Km(E′ω))m>0 whatsoever. Therefore, F is not
a limit point of the sequence (Km(E′ω))m>0. Fourthly, if F =Km(E′ω′ ) for all m≥0 and all ω′ ∈, thenP()\{Km(E′ω) :m≥0 and ω∈} is an open neighbourhood of F. Yet this set contains no term of the
sequence (Km(E′ω))m>0. Thus F is not a limit point of the sequence (Km(E′ω))m>0. To summarize,
there consequently exists no F =Km∗ (E′ω) which is a limit point of the sequence (Km(E′ω))m>0.
Therefore, the limit point Km∗ (E′ω) of the sequence (Km(E′ω))m>0 is unique. 
